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HOW MUCH IS COMMON SENSE WORTH?
WHAT YOU PAID IS WHAT IT’S WORTH, EXCEPT
WHEN IT COMES TO DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS
ELISABETH S. SHELLAN*
Cite as: Elisabeth S. Shellan, How Much Is Common Sense Worth? What You Paid Is
What It’s Worth, Except When It Comes to Debt-Equity Swaps, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT
REV. 844 (2007), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v2-2/shellan.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
This Note discusses how the gain resulting from a foreign debtequity swap should be valued for tax purposes. Usually, gain equals
the amount realized from the transaction minus the basis in the
property disposed of in the transaction (taxable gain = amount realized
– basis).1 This seems very simple. For example, what is the gain from
an exchange of pesos worth $19 million for dollar-denominated debt
worth $11 million? Easy? Yes; $19 - $11 = $8 million.
But what if the pesos you received in the exchange came with
restrictions? You could only use the pesos in Mexico; to buy land in
Mexico; to build a factory in Mexico, using only Mexican labor and
supplies; and your factory had to export goods from Mexico. Maybe
you would no longer think your pesos were worth $19 million? And
maybe you no longer believe that your taxable gain from the exchange
should be $8 million? So what are your pesos worth?
You think your pesos are worth $11 million—that is after all, what
you traded them for! But the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) thinks
*

J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. Economics, June 2001, Northwestern University.
1
26 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
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your pesos are worth $19 million (the face value of the bills is, after
all, $19 million), and determines that you have $8 million in taxable
gain! So how should your restricted pesos be valued? That is the
question this Note will attempt to answer.
This Note will first explain how gain is typically calculated and
will then describe an alternative method of calculating gain. Then, it
will summarize and critique Kohler Co. v. United States,2 the Seventh
Circuit’s decision discussing how gain from debt-equity swaps should
be calculated. Finally, this Note will conclude that United States v.
Davis3 supplies a superior method for easily and correctly valuing the
gain from debt-equity swaps.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Mexico’s Debt-Equity Swap Program
Mexico4 developed a debt-equity swap program during the
1980’s,5 while the country was in the depths of an economic crisis6
2

Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006),
reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929
(7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
3
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
4
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, the Philippines, and Venezuela had similar
programs as well. Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps:
Does Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1079 n.1
(1989); Ridgeley A. Scott, Taxation of Maquiladora Exchanges: The Taming of the
Shrew, 5 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201, 203 (1997) (citing Bruce Cohen, Tax
Implications of Debt-for-Equity Swaps, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 575,
576 (1989); Thomas Reiter, The Feasibility of Debt-Equity Swaps in Russia, 15
MICH. J. INT’L L. 909, 943-50 (1994); see generally Jon H. Sylvester, Impractibility,
Mutual Mistake and Related Contractual Bases for Equitably Adjusting the External
Debt of Sub-Saharan Africa, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 258 (1992)). New programs,
for example, in the Philippines, may emerge in the future. ASEAN asks int'l creditors
to consider debt swap scheme,
http://business.inquirer.net/money/breakingnews/view_article.php?article_id=43254
(last visited April 29, 2007); Debt-for-equity swap plan gets big boost,
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/jan/14/yehey/metro/20070114met3.html
(last visited April 29, 2007).
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and could no longer service its foreign debt.7 The goal of Mexico’s
swap program was to reduce the outstanding balance of the Mexican
government’s foreign-currency-denominated debt while encouraging
foreign investment in Mexico.8 Under the program, non-Mexican
corporations that wanted to invest in Mexico, and therefore needed
pesos, were able to purchase defaulted Mexican debt on the open
market and then swap it with the Mexican government for pesos that
could be spent only in Mexico.9 Mexico designed its program to
ensure that 1) its debt would be canceled without requiring it to use
foreign currency; 2) the non-Mexican corporation’s payment (made in
exchange for the debt cancellation) would remain in Mexico; and 3)
foreign currency would enter Mexico through the export of goods
manufactured by the Mexican subsidiary of the non-Mexico
corporation.10
For United States tax purposes, the sale of Mexico’s debt for the
restricted pesos is treated as a taxable sale.11

5

Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler I”), 247 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1085 (E.D.
Wis. 2003).
6
Id.
7
Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1989).
8
Kohler I, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1085; see generally Christopher Gottscho, Note,
Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder
U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 153 (1988) (“Viewed optimistically, debtequity swaps may ultimately provide [less developed countries] with a second
chance to develop the productive capacity that the huge amounts of external debt
incurred was intended to finance”).
9
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1033 (7th Cir.
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
10
Kohler I, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
11
Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1035.
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B. How Gain is Typically Calculated
First, it is important to understand that there is a difference
between gain and taxable gain. The word “gain” means “sources or
advantage acquired or increased.”12 This dictionary definition of
“gain” is not the same as the way the Internal Revenue Code13
computes “gain.”
In the Internal Revenue Code, the amount of gain from a sale or
exchange is determined according to 26 U.S.C. § 1001.14 Gain is equal
to, “the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted
basis.”15 The “amount realized” from a sale or exchange is “the sum of
any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other
than money) received.”16 Generally speaking, a property’s “basis” is
the cost of the property.17
If you apply these definitions to the situation described in the
introduction to this Note, your taxable gain from $19 million worth of
pesos exchanged for debt costing $11 million, would be $8 million
($19 million (amount realized) - $11 million (cost/basis)).18
Recall that if you did not receive any money in a transaction, your
“amount realized” is equal to the fair market value of the property

12

WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (Frederick C. Mish, ed.

1987).
13

“Internal Revenue Code” refers to Title 26 of the United States Code.
26 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (“Computation of gain or loss. The gain from the
sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized
therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain, and
the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for
determining loss over the amount realized). In general, the gain realized from the
conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property
differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income. 26 C.F.R. §
1.1001-1(a) (2006).
15
26 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Gain = amount realized - basis
16
26 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
17
26 U.S.C. § 1012.
18
26 U.S.C. § 1001.
14
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received in the transaction;19 and remember that you, the taxpayer, and
the IRS disagree as to the value of the pesos. What is the taxable gain
if the fair market value of the property received in the transaction is
unknown?
C. How to Determine Fair Market Value When There is No “Market?”
Sometimes the fair market value of property, like the restricted
pesos described above, is not easily determinable because there is
“little or no” market for the property.20 The fair market value of the
pesos, or any property, matters because it is one component of
calculating taxable gain. 21
The idea that the fair market value of property might be equal to
the fair market value of the property that it was exchanged for, was
first recognized by the courts in 1954, with the decision in
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States.22 The Court of
Claims23 held that “the value of the two properties exchanged in an
arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to be
equal.”24 In the case, the Court of Claims needed to determine the
taxpayer’s basis in an extension of a railway franchise (for
construction, maintenance, and operation of a passenger railway), the
fair market value of which was difficult to determine.25 The court held
that the fair market value of the franchise could be presumed to be
equal to the fair market value of the bridge for which the franchise had

19

26 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 172-73
(1988).
21
26 U.S.C. § 1001.
22
126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
23
The Court of Claims is now known as the United States Court of Federal
Claims. For information on the history of the court visit:
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/USCFChistory.htm (last visited April 29, 2007).
24
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co., 126 F. Supp. at 189.
25
Id. at 184-90.
20
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been exchanged for, if the bridge’s value was more readily
ascertainable than the franchise’s value.26
In 1962, the Philadelphia Park rule was accepted by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Davis.27 The Davis cases28 involved the tax
consequences of Mr. Davis’ transfer of stock to his former wife as part
of a property settlement executed prior to the Davis’ divorce.29
The Court looked at the income tax consequences of Mr. Davis’
transfer of stock to his wife in two steps.30 First, the Court decided
whether the transaction was a taxable event.31 Then, the Court
determined what gain resulted from the transaction.32 The Court
determined that Mr. Davis’ transfer of stock was a taxable
transaction;33 however, this result has since been superseded by
statute.34 Returning to the second issue, the Court held that absent a
readily ascertainable value, the value of Mrs. Davis’ martial rights had
a value equal to the stock she had traded for those rights.35 The Court

26

Id. at 167, 190 (emphasis added).
370 U.S. 65 (1962).
28
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) together with, Davis v. United
States, also on certiorari to the same Court.
29
Davis, 370 U.S. at 66. Specifically, Mr. Davis agreed to transfer to his wife,
1,000 shares of stock in exchange for the then Mrs. Davis’ acceptance of the stock
“in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against [her]
husband whatsoever.” Id. at 67.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 71.
34
Congress intended to overrule the result in Davis with the passage of the Tax
Reform Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369. H.R. REP. 98-432 (1984). The provision was later
codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1041, which states: “General rule. No gain or loss shall be
recognized on a transfer of property from an individual to (or in trust for the benefit
of)-- (1) a spouse, or (2) a former spouse, but only if the transfer is incident to the
divorce.” 26 U.S.C. § 1041(a) (2000).
35
Davis, 370 U.S. at 72 (“Absent a readily ascertainable value it is accepted
practice where property is exchanged to hold, as did the Court of Claims in
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States that the values ‘of the two
27
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disagreed with lower courts,36 which had found that there was no way
to compute the fair market value of Mrs. Davis’ marital rights and that
it was therefore impossible to determine the taxable gain realized by
Mr. Davis.37 The Supreme Court reasoned that it must be assumed, as
there was no evidence to the contrary, that the parties acted at armslength and that they judged their martial rights to be equal in value to
the property for which their rights were exchanged.38 The Court
concluded that once it had recognized that the transfer between
husband and wife was a taxable event, it was “more consistent with
the general purpose and scheme of the taxing statutes to make a rough
approximation of the gain realized thereby than to ignore altogether its
tax consequences.”39
In summary, the Supreme Court held in Davis that absent a
readily ascertainable value, the values of two properties exchanged in
an arms-length transaction are equal or are presumed to be equal to
each other.40 In the forty-five years since the Davis decision, neither
the Supreme Court nor Congress has overruled or superseded this
holding.

properties exchanged in an arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are
presumed to be equal’”) (internal citations omitted).
36
The Court of Claims, from which Davis had been appealed, United States v.
Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 66 (1962), had followed the precedent of the Sixth Circuit,
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 68 (1962) (“The matter was considered settled
until the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court, ruled
that, although such a transfer might be a taxable event, the gain realized thereby
could not be determined because the impossibility of evaluating the fair market value
of the wife’s martial rights. Comm’r v. Marsham, 279 F.2d 27 (1960)”).
37
Davis, 370 U.S. at 72.
38
Id. (The Court acknowledged, but was not persuaded, that, “there is much to
be said of the argument that such an assumption is weakened by the emotion, tension
and practical necessities involved in divorce negotiations and the property
settlements arising therefrom”).
39
Id. at 72-73.
40
Id. at 72.
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D. Different Approaches: Valuing Debt-Equity Swaps
Since the beginning of Mexico’s debt-equity swap program in the
early 1980’s,41 there have been few judicial decisions considering the
valuation of the amount realized, and hence the taxable gain,
stemming from debt-equity swaps with Mexico. This section will first
discuss IRS Revenue Ruling 87-124, which covers debt-equity swaps
with foreign governments.42 Then, this section will review the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in G.M. Trading Corp. v.
Commissioner43 and the United States Tax Court’s decision in CMI
International, Inc. v. Commissioner.44 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kohler Co. v. United States45 will be
discussed in Section II. As only three cases been decided, it is
premature to say there is a trend in the decisions. However, the
decisions of the Tax Court, Fifth Circuit, and Seventh Circuit have all
been in favor of the taxpayer.46
Revenue Ruling 87-124 (the “Ruling”) was promulgated by the
IRS, in 1987, to govern debt-equity swaps with foreign governments.47
The Ruling describes three situations, with Situations 2 and 3 being
variations on Situation 1.48 Situation 1 describes a debt-equity swap
similar to the program described in Section I.A. above. First, a U.S.
corporation purchases debt obligations from a U.S. bank for $60;
second, the bank delivers the debt obligation to the foreign country’s
central bank; third, the central bank credits 900 LCs (local currency) to
the U.S. corporation’s foreign subsidiary’s central bank account; and
41

Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler I”), 247 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1085 (E.D.
Wis. 2003).
42
Rev. Rul. 87-124.
43
121 F.3d 977 (5th Cir. 1997).
44
113 T.C. 1 (T.C. 1999).
45
(“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en
banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
46
G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d at 981; CMI Int’l, Inc., 113 T.C. at 5; Kohler
IV, 468 F.3d at 1037.
47
Rev. Rul. 87-124.
48
Id.
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fourth, the foreign subsidiary issues all its capital stock to its U.S.
parent.49 The Ruling acknowledged that the restrictive character of the
local currency received in the swap would “generally reduce” the fair
market value of the currency below the value of currency “convertible
at the free market exchange rate.”50 However, no further guidance for
establishing the value of the restricted currency was provided.51 The
Ruling concluded that the U.S. corporation has a gain on the exchange
of the debt obligations for the local currency “to the extent the fair
market value of the 900 LCs [local currency] exceeds $60 [the price
paid for the debt obligation].”52
Revenue rulings are not binding upon the courts.53 Since its
publication, no court has chosen to apply this Ruling. When the Fifth
Circuit examined debt-equity swaps, it described the Ruling as
erroneous as a matter of law.54 And, when the Seventh Circuit
addressed the issue, it did not even mention the Ruling in its opinion.55
In 1994, the Tax Court ruled on the first debt-equity swap case,56
which was later appealed to the Fifth Circuit in 1997.57 In G.M.
Trading Corp. v. Commissioner, G.M. had surrendered $600,000 worth
of Mexican national debt to the Mexican government in exchange for
approximately 1.7 billion pesos, whose use was restricted to the
construction of a G.M. plant in Mexico.58 The Fifth Circuit rejected
49

Id. (“Y purchased the Obligation from X for $60, which was the fair market
value of similar FC debt in the secondary markets outside of FC. X, on behalf of Y,
delivered the Obligation to the Central Bank, which credited an account of FX at the
Central Bank with 900 LCs. FX then issued all its capital stock to Y”).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Broadview Lumber Co. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 1977).
54
G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977, 980 (5th Cir. 1997).
55
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006),
reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929
(7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
56
G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 59 (T.C. 1994).
57
G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977 (5th Cir. 1997).
58
121 F.3d at 978.
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Revenue Ruling 87-124,59 because the court found that this Ruling
implicitly held that no portion of a debt-equity swap would qualify as
a nontaxable contribution to capital under 26 U.S.C. § 118.60
The court found that there were two parts to the restricted peso
payment G.M. had received.61 The first part of the peso payment by the
Mexican government to G.M. was for extinguishing part of Mexico’s
national debt.62 The second part of the payment was a contribution to
capital because the payment was to persuade G.M. to invest in
Mexico’s economy.63 The test for determining whether a particular
payment is a contribution to capital under section 118 is “the intent or
motive of [Mexico].”64 “[T]he contribution 1) must become a part of
the recipient’s capital structure; 2) may not be compensation for a
‘specific, quantifiable service’; 3) must be bargained for; 4) must
result in a benefit to the recipient; and 5) ordinarily will contribute to
the production of additional income.”65
The court concluded that the solution to the valuation problem
was to bifurcate the payment.66 G.M. would be taxed on the value of
the restricted pesos received in exchange for extinguishing the debt.67

59

Rev. Rul. 87-124.
G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d. at 980.
61
Id. at 981. Total = Payment to G.M. for extinguishing debt (Davis rule) +
Contribution to G.M.’s capital (section 118).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 980 (citing United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co.,
412 U.S. 401, 411 (1973)).
65
G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d 977, 980-81 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. at 413).
66
G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d at 980-81 (Bifurcation of a section 118
contribution to capital is allowed, according to the Fifth Circuit, because “according
to the plain terms of the statute, anything that qualifies as a contribution to capital is
nontaxable . . . the statute mandates bifurcation by requiring that any, rather than
some, contributions to capital be excluded from income”).
67
Id.
60
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The balance of the payment would be excluded from taxation as a
contribution to capital under 26 U.S.C. § 118.68
Returning to the first part of the payment (the taxable portion, not
exempt under section 118), the court found that, “when property with a
readily ascertainable value is exchanged for property without one, the
latter property is presumed to be equal in value to the former.”69 The
court emphasized that this principle reflects the common sense notion
that an asset’s value is the price persons are willing to pay for it.70 The
court concluded that since the transaction was at arms-length, and
since there was not a readily ascertainable value for the amount and
worth of the pesos exchanged for the debt extinguishment, the court
had to follow Davis and assume that value received for $600,000 of
debt was, in fact, $600,000.71
The next court to tackle the debt-equity swap valuation issue was
the United States Tax Court.72 In 1999, the United States Tax Court
issued its decision in CMI International, Inc. v. Commissioner.73 In
CMI, CMI-Texas (a wholly owned subsidiary of CMI International)
acquired a Mexican debt interest, which it transferred to Industries
(CMI-Texas’ Mexican subsidiary).74 The court articulated that while
“section 351(a) allows the tax-free exchange of property from a
shareholder to its wholly owned subsidiary, section 367(a) may deny
such treatment if the transfer is from a domestic to a foreign
corporation.”75 The court stated that the transfer described above fell
within the scope of section 367(a).76 Assuming arguendo that CMITexas realized gain on the transaction, the court held that the amount
of recognized gain was limited to zero under temporary income tax
68

Id.
Id. at 983 (citing United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962)).
70
G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d at 983.
71
Id.
72
CMI Int’l, Inc. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 1 (T.C. 1999).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 4-5.
75
Id. at 5.
76
Id.
69

854
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 14

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

regulations pursuant to section 1.367(a), because the debt interest was
not appreciated property.77
CMI is inapplicable to Kohler Co. v. United States,78 which is
discussed fully in Section II., because Kohler had not transferred its
interest in the debt obligations to its subsidiary as CMI had done.79
II. KOHLER CO. V. UNITED STATES
A. Description of the Kohler Transaction
Kohler, the Wisconsin manufacturer of plumbing products,
decided to build a plant, to be owned and operated by its Mexican
subsidiary, Sanimex, in Monterrey, Mexico.80 Kohler’s motivation for
locating its plant outside the United States was two-fold: 1)
significantly lower labor costs, and 2) an increase in its production
capacity for lower cost plumbing products in a location close to the
United States, the intended market for its products.81
Kohler became aware of the Mexican debt equity swap program,
which Kohler recognized as an opportunity to realize even greater
savings on its planned investment in Mexico.82 In May 1987, Kohler
applied to the Mexican government for approval to participate in
77

Id.
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006),
reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929
(7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
79
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler I”), 247 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1096 (E.D.
Wis. 2003). The court in Kohler I did not believe that CMI was applicable to the
Kohler transaction. Id. The lawyers that argued Kohler, Miller & Chevalier, thought
that the Kohler and CMI transactions were similar. Miller & Chevalier, Chartered
Tax Controversy Alert, http://www.millerchevalier.com/files/Publication/f13a97d07906-461d-8978-7b966825e8ba/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4d5cadea-4fc94993-a44f-92acadb7d1ce/2005-0928%20MC%20Tax%20Controversy%20Alert.pdf (last visited April 29, 2007).
80
Kohler I, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
81
Id. at 1084-85.
82
Id. at 1085.
78
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Mexico’s debt equity swap program.83 Kohler’s application was
approved in September 1987.84
Kohler purchased from Bankers Trust Company an interest in
publicly traded debt obligations owed by the Mexican government.85
The face value of the debt interest Kohler acquired was $22,439,000,
but Kohler paid only $11,114,267 for the debt.86 The transaction
between Kohler and Bankers Trust was negotiated at arms-length, with
the price paid for the debt obligations being the fair market value of
the debt at the time of the transaction. 87 Put another way, the amount
Bankers Trust received for the debt was the best price at which the
debt obligations could be sold.88
The debt equity swap transaction was finalized on December 28,
1987.89 Under the terms of the party’s agreement, four prearranged and
interrelated steps occurred.90

83

Id. at 1086.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 1087.
90
Id.
84
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KOHLER
#1: Bankers
Trust transfers
debt to Kohler
for $11M

#4 Sanimex
issues stock to
Kohler

SANIMEX
(Kohler’s
subsidiary)

KOHLER
TRANSACTION

#3: Mexico
establishes bank
account
($19.5M) for
Sanimex

BANKERS
TRUST

#2: Bankers Trust
delivers original
debt to Mexico for
cancellation

MEXICO

First, Bankers Trust transferred91 its interest in the Mexican debt
obligations to Kohler for $11,114,267.92 Second, Bankers Trust
delivered the original debt obligations to a ministry of the Mexican
government for cancellation.93 Third, the Mexican Central Bank
established a bank account, into which it deposited 43,778,766,018
Mexican pesos, for Sanimex, Kohler’s Mexican subsidiary.94 The
91

The acquisition of the debt obligations occurred in stages prior to as well as
on the actual date of the closing. Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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pesos were nominally equivalent to $19,500,564 or 87% of the face
value of the original debt obligations.95 Finally, Sanimex issued
qualified capital stock, in the name of Kohler, for 43,778,766,018
Mexican pesos.96
B. Procedural Background
Kohler treated the purchase of the debt and its sale to the Mexican
government as yielding no taxable income.97 Essentially, it was as if
the Mexican government had paid Kohler $11.1 million in dollars
rather than paying it in pesos.98 The IRS disagreed with this treatment
of the transaction and added $8.4 million to Kohler’s taxable income,
the difference between the price that Kohler had paid Bankers Trust
for the Mexican debt and $19.5 million.99
Kohler then filed with the IRS an amended tax return in which it
claimed a refund of income taxes for 1987 in the amount of
$3,350,383 (the amount of the additional tax assessed against Kohler
as a result of the IRS’s adjustment to Kohler’s income).100 The IRS
disallowed the refund claim and Kohler filed suit for a refund.101
Kohler then filed a motion for summary judgment, which was
denied by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin on February 20, 2003.102 Next, Kohler petitioned the court
to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit, which was

95

Id.
Id.
97
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1033 (7th Cir.
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler I”), 247 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088 (E.D.
Wis. 2003).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1083-84.
96
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granted.103 Then, Kohler moved again for summary judgment, which
was granted on September 1, 2005.104 Finally, the case went to the
Seventh Circuit.105
C. Seventh Circuit Decision
The first part of the court’s decision consisted of a history of
Mexico’s debt-equity swap program and a description of the
transaction involving Kohler.106
Basically, under the terms of the debt-equity swap program, the
Mexican government swapped the $11.1 million debt Kohler had
bought from Bankers Trust for $19.5 million worth of pesos, as
calculated at the then current market exchange rate of 2245 pesos to
the dollar.107 The Seventh Circuit thought that the qualification in “as
calculated at the then current market exchange rate” was critical.108
If that was not the right exchange rate to use for the transaction,
then the pesos that Kohler received may not have really been worth
$19.5 million.109 The court reasoned that the pesos were worth less
because 1) Mexico was willing to offer $19.5 million in pesos for debt
that Kohler had purchased for only $11.1 million, and 2) Mexico had
to compensate Kohler for accepting pesos that came with restrictions
that reduced their value (the pesos had to be spent in Mexico on
projects approved by the government and could not be freely
converted to dollars or other foreign currencies until 1998).110 As a
103

Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler II”), No. 01-C-753, 2003 WL
21693705 (E.D. Wis. June 4, 2003).
104
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler III”), 387 F. Supp. 2d 921, 922 (E.D.
Wis. 2005).
105
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006),
reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929
(7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
106
Id. at 1032-33.
107
Id. at 1033.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
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result, Kohler received an exchange rate of 3939 pesos to the dollar,
rather than 2245 pesos to the dollar, which is what the court said
turned $11.1 million of dollar debt into $19.5 million in pesos.111
The second part of the Seventh Circuit’s decision outlined three
different ways of accounting for Kohler’s purchase of Mexican
debt.112
First, the court proffered its preferred approach, which was “to
add $11.1 million to the basis of Kohler’s investment in the Mexican
plant.”113 The court reasoned that this would prevent Kohler from
receiving a “windfall.”114
Second, the court acknowledged an alternative way of accounting
for the swap would have been to accept Kohler’s argument. 115 Kohler
had argued that the value of the debt that it purchased was
unascertainable at the time of purchase. 116 Thus, the exchange of the
debt for the peso account should be treated as a swap yielding no
taxable income. 117 However, treating the swap in that manner would
111

Id.
Id.
113
Id. It is somewhat unclear whether the court wants to increase Kohler’s
basis by $11.1 million or decrease Kohler’s basis by $8.4 million. The relevant
section of the opinion reads, “One might have thought that the way to account for
Kohler’s purchase of Mexican debt would have been to add $11.1 million to the
basis of Kohler’s investment in the Mexican plant, so that if it ever sold the plant the
difference between on the one hand the sale price and on the other hand the sum of
$11.1 million and all the other costs of the plant would be taxable income
attributable to the sale. Then if the Mexican government's purchase of $ 11.1 million
in debt from Kohler for $ 19.5 million in pesos was a windfall for Kohler, reducing
the real cost of the plant, Kohler would realize a greater profit from the eventual sale
of the plant than it would have realized otherwise, and that profit would be taxable.
Even if the plant was never sold, the windfall would give Kohler higher profits
(presumably taxable) on sales of the plant's output because the deductions from
taxable income that it could take for depreciation of the cost of the plant would be
lessened by the $ 8.4 million reduction in its basis.” Id. at 1033-34 (emphasis
added).
114
Id. at 1033.
115
Id. at 1034.
116
Id.
117
Id.
112
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not mean that the results of Kohler’s transaction would never be
taxable, as any capital gains that resulted in the future from Kohler’s
use of the pesos to purchase goods and services for its projects would
be taxable.118
Third, another alternative method to evaluate the transaction,
would be to deem the difference between the two amounts (the face
value of the pesos and the amount paid for the debt) a contribution to
capital to Kohler by the Mexican government.119 A contribution to
capital would not be included in Kohler’s gross income,120 but would
be recorded on Kohler’s books as having a zero basis,121 and so could
not be depreciated.122 The Seventh Circuit noted that this approach
was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in G.M. Trading Corp. v.
Commissioner, but that it felt “dubious” about it.123
The court reasoned that compensation for a “specific, quantifiable
service” could not be classified as a contribution to capital and that the
Mexican government, to the extent it “overpaid” Kohler for the debt,
was buying a service from Kohler, which was the retirement of a
portion of Mexico’s foreign debt.124 The Fifth Circuit thought the
purpose of the Mexican debt-equity swap program was to encourage
foreign investment in Mexico.125 However, the Seventh Circuit said
that was a purpose, albeit a secondary purpose, to Mexico’s desire to
retire its foreign debt.126
After outlining these three approaches, the Seventh Circuit stated
that the parties had taken none of these approaches.127 Kohler and the
IRS had both treated the sale of the Mexican debt for the pesos as a
118

Id.
Id.
120
26 U.S.C. § 118(a) (2000).
121
26 U.S.C. § 362(c).
122
Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1034.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
119
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taxable sale under 26 U.S.C. § 1001(c).128 The dispute concerned only
the value to Kohler of the exchange when made.129 Kohler argued that
it had no gain from the sale.130 The IRS argued that the entire
difference between the $19.5 million in pesos that the Mexican
government gave Kohler and the $11.1 million that Kohler had paid to
buy the debt that it swapped for the pesos was taxable.131
The court disagreed with both sides.132 In the court’s opinion,
Kohler must have had some gain because “$11.1 million in Mexican
foreign debt was worth more to it than to Bankers Trust. It wanted
pesos; Bankers Trust did not.”133 However, the pesos were not worth
the full $19.5 million at which the Mexican government valued them
for purposes of the exchange, because the pesos were not convertible
into dollars or any other currency.134
In the last section of its decision, the court tasked itself with
choosing between the two adversaries’ valuations, both of which, the
court believed were “manifestly erroneous.”135 The court noted that
Kohler had argued that it needed no evidence, citing to United States v.
Davis,136 which the court characterized as being “superficially similar”
to the Kohler transaction.137 The Seventh Circuit stated that the
Supreme Court “merely assumed,” but did not hold that the wife’s
martial rights could not be ascertained with sufficient precision to
enable a calculation of the husband’s gain or loss.138 The court
distinguished Davis by stating, “The problem in our case is different.

128

Id. at 1035.
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
129
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It is what to do when the value of the property exchanged may well be
ascertainable but has not been ascertained.”139
Nevertheless, the court found that the government’s assessment of
the value of the pesos was “undeniably excessive” because it took no
account of the restrictions that the Mexican government had placed on
the pesos.140 However, the court found “Kohler’s efforts [at valuation]
. . . equally pathetic.”141
In the court’s words, “The same thing can be worth more to one
person (Kohler) than to another (Bankers Trust); that is the basis of
market transactions. To a holder of Mexican debt that had no use for
pesos, the debt was worth only half its face amount; to someone like
Kohler who needed a great many pesos, the debt was worth more.”142
The court emphasized that, “the Service could have justified a
more modest estimate yet one well above $ 11.1 million, but clinging
stubbornly to its untenable valuation it suggested no alternative to
$19.5 million.”143 Finally, the court concluded that since the
government “played all or nothing” and lost, it would “ge[t]
nothing.”144
III. ANALYSIS
This section will first discuss three problems with the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Kohler: 1) the Seventh Circuit misunderstood the
difference between gain and taxable gain, 2) the court needlessly
found Davis distinguishable, and 3) that courts basis-increase (or
decrease) approach was baseless. Then, this section will comment on
the Seventh Circuit’s correct decision to reject 26 U.S.C. § 118 as a

139

Id. at 1036.
Id.
141
Id. at 1037.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. The usual rule is that the party with the burden of proof (Kohler) would
lose. Id. at 1035.
140
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way to account for the transaction. Finally, this section will conclude
that the Davis rule should have applied to the Kohler transaction.
A. The Seventh Circuit Misperceived the Difference
Between Gain and Taxable Gain.
The overriding problem with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in
Kohler is the court’s confusion between gain (i.e. “I entered into this
transaction because I am better off after the transaction is complete”)
and taxable gain. As discussed previously, taxable gain is equal to the
amount realized minus basis.145
Kohler had argued that it had no gain from the sale of its debt to
Mexico.146 The court’s reaction was that Kohler’s position was
“untenable.”147 To the court, $11.1 million in Mexican foreign debt
was worth more to Kohler than to Bankers Trust because Kohler
wanted pesos, while Bankers Trust did not want pesos.148 Kohler had
argued, in the court’s opinion, “absurdly,” that if Kohler had gained
from the purchase, the bank must have lost, which Kohler contended
the bank would not have done.149 The court’s position was that, “most
transactions produce a gain to both parties—that is what induces the
transaction.”150 In this sentence, the court is illustrating gain, but not
taxable gain.
For example, assume that Kate has a digital camera and Matt has
a projector, both of which have a fair market value of $100 and a basis
of $10. Let’s say that Kate trades her digital camera for Matt’s
projector, because Kate really wants a digital camera and Matt really
wants a projector. Perhaps Kate likes Matt’s projector so much that she
would be willing to pay him $125 for the projector. Even though
Kate’s new projector was worth $125 to her, Kate’s taxable gain from
145

26 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). Taxable gain = amount realized – basis.
Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1035.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
146
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the exchange is only $90, because the fair market value of the
projector was only $100.151 For non-cash sales, what is taxed by the
government is the difference between the fair market value of the
property and the taxpayer’s basis in the property.152 Nowhere in the
Internal Revenue Code does it state that a taxpayer’s personal value in
the property, for example, the fact that Kate really wanted a projector
or pesos, come into play.
Or, suppose I buy a bottle of soda from a vending machine. I’m
really thirsty, so I would be willing to pay $3.00 for a drink. Luckily,
the vending machine only needs $1.25 in order to release a bottle. The
government does not tax me on my $1.75 “gain.”153
This first misstep leads the court down the wrong path—looking
for a way to measure non-existent “gain” it finds to be inherent in the
Kohler transaction.154 Since the court has concluded there must be
“gain,” the court needs to find a way to distinguish the Kohler
transaction from Davis. If the Davis rule had been applied to the
Kohler transaction, Kohler’s swap would have been a “wash,” given

151

$90 gain = $100 amount realized - $10 basis.
26 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
153
A similar idea to the concept described above is known as “imputed
income.” Imputed income, which is not taxed, is a form of non-cash income that
stems from the enjoyment of property, or from goods used by the taxpayer, or from
services performed for or by the taxpayer. John K. McNulty & Daniel J. Lathrope,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, 46 (Thomson West 2004) (1972). For
example, the benefit a student receives in excess of the cost of tuition paid, would be
imputed income. Id. While nothing in the Internal Revenue Code excludes imputed
income from taxation, an “unstated exclusion” generally shelters such income from
tax, partly because of the administrative and compliance problems involved with
attempting to tax imputed income. Id. For example, 26 U.S.C. § 132 taxes some
employee fringe benefits, which can be considered a form of imputed income. Id.
154
But c.f. Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third
World Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143,
169 (1988) (“The popularity of debt-equity swap financing of [less developed
countries] investments among investors indicates there may be some merit to this
perception of gain.”]
152
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that the debt interest and the restricted pesos would be deemed to have
equal values. 155
B. The Court Needlessly Finds Davis Distinguishable.
The second flaw in the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning occurs when
the court concludes that United States v. Davis is not applicable to the
Kohler transaction.156 Recall that Davis held that absent a readily
ascertainable value, the value of two properties exchanged in an armslength transaction are either equal or presumed to be equal in value.157
The court misconstrues the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis by
claiming, “[t]he problem in our case is different. It is what to do when
the value of the property exchanged may well be ascertainable158 but
has not been ascertained.”159
This of course is not what Davis said.160 The Court stated that,
“Absent a readily ascertainable value it is accepted practice where
property is exchanged to hold, as did the Court of Claims in
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States that the values ‘of
the two properties exchanged in an arms-length transaction are either
equal in fact, or are presumed to be equal.’”161 The key phrase in
Davis was “readily ascertainable.” “Readily” means “without much
difficultly: easily.”162 It follows that if the value of the debt interest is
easily ascertainable whereas the value of the restricted pesos is not
155

United States v. Davis , 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962).
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir.
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
157
Davis, 370 U.S. at 72.
158
For examples of different ways to value restricted currency, see Leslie A.
Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does Revenue Ruling 87124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079 (1989).
159
Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1036.
160
Davis, 370 U.S. at 72.
161
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
162
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (Frederick C. Mish, ed.
1987).
156
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easily ascertainable, the court should have followed the Davis rule and
concluded that the value of the debt interest and restricted pesos were
equal.
Other commentators have noted that the use of the Davis rule
should be acceptable in debt equity swaps.163 This is because the fair
market value of debt-equity currency, in this case, the restricted pesos,
is affected by the limitations on the use of the currency.164 In contrast,
the fair market value of the debt obligation may be more readily and
reliably ascertained165 because there is a market for the debt
obligations.166 Providing further proof of the sensibility of the Davis
rule (i.e. the value of the restricted pesos was equal to the value of the
debt obligation) is the fact that, “[e]ven if, despite the investment
restrictions, a buyer could be found who met the [swap country’s]
restrictions, the buyer probably would not pay more for the investment
than the U.S. parent paid, assuming the buyer also could utilize debtequity swaps.”167
The discussion of why United States v. Davis168 is the preferred
analysis will resume in Subsection E.
C. Adding Basis is Baseless.
The Seventh Circuit suggests in dicta that the proper way to
account for Kohler’s debt purchase would be to add $11.1 million to

163

Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1110 (1989).
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler I”), 247 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (E.D.
Wis. 2003); see Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third
World Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143,
147-49 (1988).
167
Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 172
(1988).
168
370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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the basis of Kohler’s investment in the Mexican plant.169 It is
somewhat unclear whether the court desires to add $11.1 million to
Kohler’s basis170 or subtract $8.4 million from Kohler’s basis.171 The
court reasoned that this basis-increase (or basis-decrease) approach
would prevent Kohler from receiving a “windfall.”172
Here, adding $11.1 million to its basis would be a gift to Kohler.
Taxpayers love basis because it lowers their potential taxable gain.
For example, if Kohler sold the factory for $50 million and its
basis was $29 million173 adding $11.1 million to Kohler’s basis would
result in basis being $40.1. Upon the sale, the taxable gain would then
be $50 million minus $40.1 million, or $9.9 million. Without adding
the “extra” $11.1 million to the basis, Kohler’s taxable gain would
have been $21 million, $50 million minus $29 million. Obviously,
giving Kohler additional basis is not a good solution if the court wants
to ensure Kohler is not receiving a tax-free windfall.174
On the other hand, the court’s basis-decrease (or “wait-andsee”175) approach is more sensible. If this is the case, it seems that the
court is alluding to treating the Kohler transaction as an “open
169

Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1033 (7th Cir.
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
170
Id. at 1033-34 (“One might have thought that the way to account for
Kohler’s purchase of Mexican debt would have been to add $11.1 million to the
basis of Kohler’s investment in the Mexican plant, so that if it ever sold the plant the
difference between on the one hand the sale price and on the other hand the sum of
$11.1 million and all the other costs of the plant would be taxable income
attributable to the sale”) (emphasis added).
171
Id. (“Even if the plant was never sold, the windfall would give Kohler
higher profits (presumably taxable) on sales of the plant's output because the
deductions from taxable income that it could take for depreciation of the cost of the
plant would be lessened by the $ 8.4 million reduction in its basis”) (emphasis
added).
172
Id. at 1033.
173
Id. at 1032 (Kohler estimated the plant in Mexico would cost at least $29
million to build).
174
Id. at 1033.
175
Id. at 1035.
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transaction.” An “open transaction” is when the sale or exchange or
property does not result in reported income at the time of the sale or
exchange.176 If the transaction is treated as “open,” Kohler would not
be deemed to have received taxable income until Kohler’s basis (the
$11.1 million it had paid for the debt obligation) had been
recovered.177 However, receipt of property, in this case the pesos, is
usually “treated as a final sale and a value is somehow placed upon
it.”178
In any case, the court’s suggestion does not matter because the
swap is considered a taxable sale; 179 and the court’s approach does not
appear to be allowed by either statue or precedent. Moreover, the open
transaction issue may not arise as the IRS, in Revenue Ruling 87-124,
which the IRS promulgated to govern foreign debt-equity swaps,
views the gain “as occurring at the conversion stage of the
transaction.”180
D. Correct to Reject Section 118
The Seventh Circuit was correct in rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s
endorsement of 26 U.S.C. § 118 as a way of handling the debt-equity
swap tax problem. Section 118(a) of the Internal Revenue Code states,
“In the case of a corporation, gross income does not include any
contribution to the capital of the taxpayer.”181 This exclusion “applies
to the value of land or other property contributed to a corporation by a
governmental unit or by a civic group for the purpose of inducing the

176

John K. McNulty & Daniel J. Lathrope, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS, 348 (Thomson West 2004) (1972).
177
Id. at 349.
178
Id.
179
Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1035.
180
Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 178-79
(1988).
181
26 U.S.C. § 118(a) (2000); G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977,
980 (5th Cir. 1997).
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corporation to locate its business in a particular community.”182
Contributions to capital can also be made by foreign governments for
purposes of inducing business location or expansion.183
The primary test for whether a transaction will be considered a
section 118 contribution to capital is the intent of the person who made
the payment.184 Here, it is clear the Mexican government’s motivation
was two-fold, to encourage economic development, but mainly to
retire its foreign debt.185 The law is that compensation for a “specific,
quantifiable service” cannot be a contribution to capital.186 Here,
Mexico was buying a service from Kohler—the retirement of a portion
of Mexico’s foreign debt,187 which would exclude the application of
26 U.S.C. § 118 to the Kohler transaction.188
E. The Davis Rule Should Have Applied to the Kohler Transaction.
Davis should be applied exactly in situations such as the
transaction at issue in Kohler, where the value of restricted pesos is
not easily ascertainable, but the value of the debt interest is readily
ascertainable.
182

26 C.F.R. § 1.118-1 (1996); G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d at 980.
26 C.F.R. § 1.118-1; Rev. Rul. 70-226.
184
Ridgeley A. Scott, Taxation of Maquiladora Exchanges: The Taming of the
Shrew, 5 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201, 211 (1997).
185
Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th Cir.
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
186
Id. (citing United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412
U.S. 401, 413 (1973)).
187
Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1034.
188
26 U.S.C. § 118(a) (2000).
183
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First, the Davis rule is generally accepted189 and it is a principle of
tax law that has been reaffirmed many times.190 It is generally
accepted because it is intuitively sensible. Unrelated parties in armslength transactions generally do not give the other side more money
for their property than it is worth.191 The motivation of unrelated
189

United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962) (“Absent a readily
ascertainable value it is accepted practice where property is exchanged to hold, as
did the Court of Claims in Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 130
Ct. Cl. 166, 172, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (1954), that the values ‘of the two properties
exchanged in an arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to
be equal.’ Accord, United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (C. A. 6th Cir.
1960); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (C. A. 2d Cir.
1943)”).
190
G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977, 983 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
see, e.g., Keener v. Exxon Co., USA, 32 F.3d 127, 132 (4th Cir.1994) (“An actual
price, agreed to by a willing buyer and a willing seller, is the most accurate gauge of
the value the market places on a good”); Dessauer v. Comm’r, 449 F.2d 562, 566
(8th Cir.1971); Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir.1970);
Pulliam v. Comm’r, 329 F.2d 97, 99 (10th Cir.1964); see also United States v.
Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc) (assuming, without deciding, the
applicability of Davis ); cf. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551, 93 S. Ct.
1713, 1716 (1973) (“The willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market value is
nearly as old as the federal income, estate, and gifts taxes themselves”); McDonald
v. Comm’r, 764 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir.1985) (“We express initially a strong
disinclination to disturb the established meaning of the term "fair market value' as it
was enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cartwright”); but cf.
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 590 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir.1979) (declining to apply the Davis
rule to a stock option, the value of which could be easily determined when sold
(though the value could not easily be determined when the option was granted), and
cautioning that the Davis rule should be applied only as a last resort to prevent
taxable exchanges without readily ascertainable values from escaping taxation
altogether)).
191
Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1105 (1989) (“After
all the market price on which the negotiated cost of the obligation would be based
presumably reflects what debt for equity swaps are worth to buyers and sellers of
developing country debt”); Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap
Financing of Third World Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8
VA. TAX REV. 143, 174 (1988) (“Yet the best reason for applying the presumed
equivalence-in-value [Davis] rule is hat there is no reason to believe an investor
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parties is to get the best price they can; not to give their opponent
“freebies.”
In addition to being intuitively sensible, the Davis rule has been
applied to an analogous fact situation.192 The Fifth Circuit, in G.M.
Trading Corp. v. Commissioner, concluded that since G.M. had
surrendered $600,000 of debt to the Mexican government in exchange
for an unknown value of restricted pesos, the court had to assume that
the value received for $600,000 of debt was, in fact, $600,000 since
the transaction was at arms-length and the value of the restricted pesos
was not readily ascertainable.193 The G.M. court reaffirmed Davis,194
and noted that this principle reflects the common sense notion that an
asset’s value is the price persons are willing to pay for it.195
Further strengthening the appeal of the Davis rule is that Court of
Claims, the court that originated the rule in Philadelphia Park
Amusement Co. v. United States,196 believes that the Davis rule can be
to some extent widely applied.197 The Court of Claims in Tasty Baking
Co. considered the situation of a taxpayer who had contributed real
property to his employee’s pension plan.198 The court said, “[i]t is
clear . . . that the technique of presuming an intangible and
unappraisable contribution as an equal exchange for property
transferred is to be applied to a variety of situations broad enough at
least to include a taxpayer who desires the separation of a wife, and
one who wishes the continued adhesion of an employee.199 The court
concluded that the quid pro quo for the contribution was the past and
future services of the taxpayer’s employees, which was presumptively
would pay any more for an equity investment that it believes the investment is
worth”).
192
G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977, 983 (5th Cir. 1997).
193
Id.
194
Id. (citing see United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962)).
195
G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d at 983.
196
126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
197
Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 184 Ct. Cl. 56, 61-62 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
198
Id. at 59.
199
Id. at 61-62 (emphasis added).
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equal to the fair market value of the real property contributed to the
pension plan.200
Most importantly, the fact situations of the cases where the Davis
rule has been effectively applied are more similar to the characteristics
of debt-equity swaps than the characteristics of transactions where the
Davis rule did not apply.201
For example, in Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney the court held that
the Davis rule applied in a situation where a taxpayer202 traded 51.576
acres of land and improvements in exchange for the taxpayer’s
indebtedness and open accounts.203 The court noted that there was no
market established for the note and open accounts and that it would be
difficult, even for an expert, to value the note and open accounts.204
The Davis rule has also been applied to value gasoline distribution
agreements,205 and stock that has no readily ascertainable market value
because no sales of the stock had ever been made.206
In contrast, in Dessauer v. Commissioner the court held that the
Davis rule was inapplicable because, “[t]here is nothing inherently
difficult in ascertaining the value of commercial paper which is
regularly bought and sold on the market.”207 In another case, the court
found that a taxpayer was not entitled to rely on Davis to value a stock
option because the value of the option, although not readily
ascertainable at the time it was granted, could be determined with
precision at the time it was sold.208
200

Id. at 63.
Bar L Ranch v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 955, 996 (5th Cir., 1970); Spartan
Petroleum Co. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. S.C. 1977); S. Natural
Gas Co. v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 302, 352 (1969); but c.f. Dessauer v. Comm’r,
449 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Comm’r, 590 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir.
1979).
202
Bar L Ranch, 426 F.2d at 999 (The taxpayer was insolvent).
203
Id. at 1001.
204
Id.
205
Spartan Petroleum Co., 437 F. Supp. at 733-36.
206
S. Natural Gas Co., 188 Ct. Cl. at 352.
207
449 F.2d at 566.
208
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 590 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 1979).
201
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Unlike commercial paper and stock options, it is difficult to
ascertain the value of restricted pesos, such as the ones at issue in
Kohler.209 One commentator has noted that, “[t]he main limitation on
the practice of valuing property received according to the appraisable
property exchanged is that its use is confined to cases where there is
‘little or no market’ for the unappraisable property . . . [but the]
restrictions imposed by [swap countries] on investments financed by
debt-equity swaps assure that this limitation is inapplicable.” 210 The
restricted pesos offered by Mexico “can only be used for approved
investments and cannot be sold.” 211 In addition, “[t]he secondary
market exists only for debt; there are no firm indicators of the local
currency’s value apart from subjective discounting which is inaccurate
due to lack of liquidity and political risk.”212
Moreover, not following the Davis rule leads to unreasonable
results, given the fact that the debt-equity swap valuation problem can
be easily solved by application of the Davis rule. The only solution
offered by the Seventh Circuit is that the court could estimate the
value of the restricted currency itself. After the court determined that
the value of the pesos “may well be ascertainable but has not been
ascertained,”213 the court suggested that the IRS present evidence that
could persuade a rational fact finder that the pesos Kohler received
from the Mexican government were worth well above $11.1 million.214
209

See Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th
Cir. 2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
210
Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 172-73
(1988). “The presumed-equivalence-in-value rule of Davis has generally been
limited to ‘cases involving valuation of property for which there is little or no
market.’” Bar L Ranch v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting Seas
Shipping Co. v. Comm’r, 371 F.2d 528, 529 (2d Cir. 1967)).
211
Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 172-73
(1988).
212
Id.
213
Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1036-37.
214
Id. at 1037.
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This suggestion seems to inapposite to the court’s own dismay
surrounding Kohler’s and the IRS’s “pathetic” attempts as valuing the
restricted pesos.215
Furthermore, the application of this policy would be very
problematic for a debt-equity investor.216 This type of rule is
“judgmental” as opposed to “mechanical.”217 Mechanical rules are
rigid and can be predictably applied, while judgmental rules can be
manipulated.218 In addition, judgmental rules require legal advice and
often litigation, which makes their application expensive.219 On top of
which, the outcome will be unpredictable, especially when there is an
absence of judicial precedents and a lack of reliable expert
testimony.220 These disadvantages could discourage debt-equity swaps,
especially when investors consider that their estimate could be
different from the court’s estimate, making them liable for taxes that
they never expected to pay.221

215

Id.
Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1102 (1989).
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 1084 (“[t]he uncertain tax consequences of swaps may actually deter
potential investors from embarking on these transactions”).
216
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CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit should have applied the Davis rule in Kohler
Co. v. United States.222 The Davis rule is generally accepted223 and it is
a principle of tax law that has been reaffirmed many times.224 The
Davis rule is intuitively sensible; unrelated parties in arms-length
transactions do not give their adversary more money for their property
than it is worth.225 Most importantly, the fact situations of the cases
222

Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006),
reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929
(7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
223
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962) (“Absent a readily
ascertainable value it is accepted practice where property is exchanged to hold, as
did the Court of Claims in Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 130
Ct. Cl. 166, 172, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (1954), that the values ‘of the two properties
exchanged in an arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to
be equal.’ Accord, United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (C. A. 6th Cir.
1960); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (C. A. 2d Cir.
1943)”).
224
G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977, 983 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
see, e.g., Keener v. Exxon Co., USA, 32 F.3d 127, 132 (4th Cir.1994) (“An actual
price, agreed to by a willing buyer and a willing seller, is the most accurate gauge of
the value the market places on a good”); Dessauer v. Comm’r, 449 F.2d 562, 566
(8th Cir.1971); Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir.1970);
Pulliam v. Comm’r, 329 F.2d 97, 99 (10th Cir.1964); see also United States v.
Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc) (assuming, without deciding, the
applicability of Davis ); cf. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551, 93 S. Ct.
1713, 1716 (1973) (“The willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market value is
nearly as old as the federal income, estate, and gifts taxes themselves”); McDonald
v. Comm’r, 764 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir.1985) (“We express initially a strong
disinclination to disturb the established meaning of the term "fair market value' as it
was enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cartwright”); but cf.
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 590 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir.1979) (declining to apply the Davis
rule to a stock option, the value of which could be easily determined when sold
(though the value could not easily be determined when the option was granted), and
cautioning that the Davis rule should be applied only as a last resort to prevent
taxable exchanges without readily ascertainable values from escaping taxation
altogether)).
225
Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1105 (1989) (“After
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where the Davis rule has been applied are more similar to the
characteristics of debt-equity swaps than the characteristics of
transactions where the Davis rule has not been applied.226 This is
because “[t]he main limitation on the practice of valuing property
received according to the appraisable property exchanged is that its
use is confined to cases where there is ‘little or no market’ for the
unappraisable property . . . [but the] restrictions imposed by [swap
countries] on investments financed by debt-equity swaps assure that
this limitation is inapplicable.” 227
Moreover, not following the Davis rule leads to unreasonable
results. If Davis is applied, the Kohler transaction described above
would be treated as a “wash.”228 This means that Kohler would not
have any taxable gain (or loss) from the exchange of $11 million debt
for $19 million of restricted pesos.

all the market price on which the negotiated cost of the obligation would be based
presumably reflects what debt for equity swaps are worth to buyers and sellers of
developing country debt”); Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap
Financing of Third World Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8
VA. TAX REV. 143, 174 (1988) (“Yet the best reason for applying the presumed
equivalence-in-value [Davis] rule is hat there is no reason to believe an investor
would pay any more for an equity investment that it believes the investment is
worth”).
226
Bar L Ranch v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 955, 996 (5th Cir., 1970); Spartan
Petroleum Co. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. S.C. 1977); S. Natural
Gas Co. v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 302, 352 (1969); but c.f. Dessauer v. Comm’r,
449 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Comm’r, 590 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir.
1979).
227
Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 172-73
(1988).
228
Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1106 (1989) (“If an
investor may validly apply this equation [Davis rule] in determining the tax
consequences of a debt for equity swap, the amount realized on the swap will equal
the swap’s cost to the investor, yielding no taxable gain”).
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On the other hand, if the Seventh Circuit’s dicta in Kohler229 is
applied to debt-equity swaps, companies, like Kohler would not know
the cost of their debt-equity swap transactions beforehand.230
Companies would have to hire experts to value the restricted currency,
and then litigate the matter if the IRS disagreed with the expert’s
valuation. 231 This is unreasonable, especially since the debt-equity
swap valuation problem can be easily solved by application of the
Davis rule.232

229

Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir.
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).
230
Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1102 (1989).
231
Id.
232
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962).
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